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Abstract
The literature appears to have reached a consensus that nancial globalization has had a
"disciplining eect" on monetary policy, as it has reduced the returns from { and hence the
temptation for { using monetary policy to stabilize output. As a result, monetary policy over
recent years has placed more emphasis on stabilizing ination, resulting in reduced ination
and greater output stability. However, this consensus has not been accompanied by convincing
empirical evidence that such a relationship exists. One reason is likely to be that de facto mea-
sures of nancial globalization are endogenous, and that instruments for nancial globalization
are elusive. In this paper, I introduce a new instrument, nancial remoteness, as a plausibly
exogenous instrument for nancial openness. I examine the relationship between nancial glob-
alization and median ination levels over an 11 year cross-section from 1994 through 2004, as
well as a panel of 5-year median ination levels between 1980 and 2004. The results conrm a
negative relationship between median ination and nancial globalization in the base specica-
tion, but this relationship is sensitive to the inclusion of conditioning variables or country xed
eects, precluding any strong inferences.
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This paper oers a contribution to the literature on globalization and macroeconomic performance.
To keep the analysis tractable, I restrict my attention to the potential impact of nancial global-
ization, loosely dened as the phenomenon of increased international cross-holdings of assets and
its implied increased international asset substitutability. This phenomenon has led to a reduction,
but in no sense an elimination of, the so-called "home bias" eect, whereby economic agents are
found to hold a disproportionate share of their asset portfolios in assets originating from their
home country. The relationship between nancial integration and macroeconomic volatility is am-
biguous in theory. Volatility may increase in the wake of nancial globalization, as agents may
rationally respond to enhanced risk-sharing opportunities by increasing the specialization of their
home country production bundles [e.g. Kalemli-Ozcan, Srensen, and Yosha (2003)], or it may
decline, as in Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001), where rms in countries with less-developed
domestic nancial sectors may enjoy greater capacity to smooth investment.
In a series of recent papers, a group of researchers at the International Monetary Fund have
documented the fragility of the evidence of macroeconomic benets of nancial integration. Kose,
Prasad, and Terrones (2003a) demonstrate that the ratio of consumption volatility to income in-
creased during the 1990s for more nancially-integrated economies. Kose, Prasad, and Terrones
(2007) demonstrate that nancial globalization has led to little increase risk-sharing among emerg-
ing market economies, even among those that are relatively more nancially integrated with the rest
of the world. Similarly, Kose, Prasad, and Terrones (2003b) demonstrate that consumption corre-
lations across countries did not increase in the 1990s, the period corresponding to rapid increases
in nancial globalization, as would have been expected. Prasad, Rogo, Wei, and Kose (2003)
also fail to nd a statistically signicant relationship between nancial integration and growth or
a negative relationship between nancial integration and consumption volatility. Indeed, they nd
that in the short run, consumption volatility is positively related to levels of nancial integration.
1Their ndings have been corroborated in a number of independent studies. Buch, Doepke,
and Pierdzioch (2005) nd no systematic relationship between nancial integration and output
volatility. Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2006) do nd that nancial liberalization is associated
with reduced consumption volatility, but other studies have obtained dierent results, as in Fujiki
and Terada-Haiwara (2007), who demonstrate that increased nancial integration is not measurably
associated with reduced consumption volatility in East Asian economies.
Stronger results for nancial integration and macroeconomic volatility have recently been found
by Rose and Spiegel (2008), using nancial remoteness, measured as the natural logarithm of great-
circle distance to the closest major nancial center (London, New York, or Tokyo) as an indicator
of nancial integration. Relative to other measures of nancial integration in the literature, this
measure has the advantage of plausible exogeneity, particularly for their sub-sample that excludes
large countries, as small countries are unlikely to have had much inuence on the geographic allo-
cation of world nancial centers. Using this measure, Rose and Spiegel (2008) nd an economically
signicant relationship between nancial remoteness and macroeconomic volatility that is positive
and usually statistically signicant.
This paper applies the nancial remoteness variable to the question of nancial integration
and the quality of monetary policy outcomes. Obstfeld (1998) and Rogo (2004) have argued
that increased international capital mobility could have a "disciplining eect" on monetary policy.
Increased international asset substitutability reduces the eectiveness of using ination as a source
of government revenues. Holding all else equal, this should reduce the inationary pressure on
central banks and result in lower average levels of ination.
In concentrating on nancial globalization, there are a number of other components of global-
ization in a broad sense that may independently impact monetary policy that I ignore. For example,
Rogo (2004) argues that increased competition worldwide has increased the slope of the Philips
curve, reducing the gains from, and hence pressure for, loose monetary policy. Alternatively, some
2have argued [e.g. Borio and Filardo (2007)] that increased goods tradability has left global, rather
than domestic capacity the relevant metric for measuring the output gap.1
Moreover, the rate of ination is not directly tied to welfare, and therefore represents an
intermediate policy goal. For example, price stability is typically valued because it has been shown
to be associated superior overall economic performance. As such, one might wonder why it would
not be preferable to examine the relationship between nancial openness and long-term economic
growth directly. One answer may be that it appears to be dicult to detect the growth benets
of nancial globalization, which may only appear over long time periods and may even be dicult
to detect in panels over long time periods in specications that condition for institutional and
other domestic characteristics whose values may be a function of nancial openness and leave little
explanatory power to the nancial openness variable itself [Kose, Prasad, Rogo, and Wei (2006)].
Empirical evidence for the disciplining eect on nancial openness on monetary policy is rel-
atively limited. One notable exception is Tytell and Wei (2005), who examine the relationship
between de facto nancial openness and monetary and scal discipline. They nd that nancial
openness is negatively related to average ination, but has no measurable aect on the government
budget decit.
In examining the relationship between nancial development and policy outcomes, causality
is always in question. As an instrument, Tytell and Wei (2005) consider nancial openness in
neighboring countries in the same geographic region, weighted by distance from the country in
question. They motivate using this instrument by noting that countries from some region of the
world, such as Latin America, have a disproportionate amount of nancial interaction with common
countries, in this case the United States.2
1However, see Ihrig, Kamin, Lindner, and Marquez (2007) which questions the validity of the global capacity
hypothesis based on the domestic consumer price level's lack of sensitivity to the foreign output gap.
2Tytell and Wei (2005) also move beyond a linear specication to allow for "threshold eects" in macroeco-
nomic policies using a transition matrix approach. They nd a signicantly negative relationship between nancial
integration and the probability of transitioning from a low to a moderate ination regime.
3This paper uses the same de facto measure of nancial integration as that used in Tytell and
Wei (2005), the sum of international capital outows and inows as a share of GDP using the Lane
and Milesi-Ferretti (2001) data set as the measure of capital ows. Kose, Prasad, Rogo, and Wei
(2006) argue that this provides the best indicator of nancial integration, as gross ows are less
volatile than net ows and are particularly appropriate as measures of risk sharing. However, the
analysis here diers from that in Tytell and Wei (2005) in that it makes use of nancial remoteness
as a plausibly exogenous instrument for the level of nancial integration.3 This instrument is not
time-varying, as the Tytell and Wei (2005) instrument is, but as we argue in Rose and Spiegel
(2008), it has a strong claim to plausible exogeneity. It seems possible that some shock, such as a
large change in the price of oil, could have common implications for capital ows within a region,
as well as macroeconomic policies within that region, depending on whether the region is a net
oil importer or exporter, that could be problematic for the instrument used in Tytell and Wei
(2005). Still, as one instrument is time-varying while the other is not, I view the analysis here to
be complementary to that done in their paper.
In addition, I introduce some conditioning variables not considered in Tytell and Wei (2005).
These latter extensions appear to have substantive implications. I largely conrm a negative re-
lationship between de facto nancial openness and ination for a univariate specication with or
without instrumenting, but these ndings do not appear to be robust to conditioning for country
wealth or simply for introducing country xed eects in a non-instrumented specication.
In the end, then, the results with this new instrument appear to be similar to much of the
existing literature: While there is clearly a negative univariate relationship between nancial in-
tegration and monetary stability, and indeed one that appears to stand up to instrumenting to
address endogeneity issues, the importance of this relationship is very sensitive to sample specica-
tion. In particular, both nancial integration and monetary stability appear to be characteristics
3As a robustness check, I also follow Rose and Spiegel (2008) and consider nancial remoteness as a possible
indicator of nancial integration itself, with similar results.
4of well-functioning economies, but so are a myriad of other factors examined in the literature, such
as the level of development of the domestic nancial sector, the quality of institutions, or indeed,
simply an economy's level of GDP per capita. The prospects of ever isolating the role of nancial
globalization empirically do not seem promising.
The remainder of this paper is divided into six sections. Section 2 provides a brief review of
the marked recent increase in nancial globalization. Section 3 discusses normative implications of
nancial globalization for monetary policy. Section 4 reviews monetary policy performance under
nancial globalization. Section 5 introduces the new empirical evidence using nancial remoteness
as an instrument. Section 6 concludes.
2 Scope of nancial globalization
I follow the literature [e.g. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001) and Prasad, Rogo, Wei, and Kose
(2003)] in dening de facto nancial openness as gross international asset positions as a share
of GDP, measured as the sum of stocks of external assets and liabilities of FDI and portfolio
investmentas a share of GDP. This is the measure advocated in (Kose, Prasad, Rogo, and Wei,
2006).
As is well-documented, nancial globalization according to this measure took o in both in-
dustrial and emerging market countries in the latter half of the 1990s [e.g. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2003)]. There are a number of reasons for this dramatic upturn in international capital move-
ments: Technological progress has reduced the cost of acquiring and managing holdings of foreign
assets, and thereby increased investors' demand for internationally diversied portolios. In addi-
tion, innovations in nance have increased the capacity for hedging investment positions, leading
to a proliferation of available international investment vehicles.
These ows have coincided with a large buildup of net surplus positions by emerging market
5economies, and, in particular, by emerging Asian and commodity-producing nations. Current
account surpluses of emerging Asian nations are now at levels comparable to those that followed
the Asian nancial crisis. As of the current year, overall Asian holdings of foreign exchange reserves
excluding gold reached close to 3:3 trillion dollars. These increased capital ows have had a number
of important impacts on the international economy. In particular, the emergence of emerging market
economies as net creditors has allowed some developed economies, notably the United States, to
nance large current account imbalances at relatively favorable rates.
This pattern of capital ows, with developed economies being net borrowers from emerging
economies, is generally considered to be nonstandard for a number of reasons: First, standard
theory suggests that capital scarcity in developing countries leaves their marginal products of capital
higher than the developed countries as a group. This implies that holding all else equal, investors
should nd more attractive opportunities in emerging market economies than in their developed
counterparts. Second, at least for the rapidly growing developing countries, higher expected future
incomes provide an incentive to run current account decits now to smooth consumption. Instead,
paradoxically, the largest net surpluses we observe in the data come from some of the most rapidly
growing countries, such as China.
Much work recently has gone into explaining this paradoxical investment pattern. These
include theories about dierences in the quality of nancial intermediation between developed and
emerging market economies, where portfolio capital moves from South to north, to return as foreign
direct investment [e.g. Mendoza, Quadrini, and Rios-rull (2007)].
Alternatively, the so-called Bretton Woods II School [e.g. Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber
(2004)] argue that net outows from China serve as collateral against future opportunistic behavior.
While these arguments are interesting, they appear to run into problems when confronted by the
data. In particular, Figure 1 demonstrates that the pattern of buildup in Chinese reserves, which
represents the majority of the net imbalances run by the United States with the Asian region, comes
6much later than its buildup of foreign direct investment. As a result, it would appear dicult to
motivate this buildup by the desire to encourage inward foreign direct investment.
Another explanation is associated with Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke (2005), who ar-
gued that poor investment opportunities in Asia have resulted in a global "savings glut," that has
freed up capital for lending to developed economies. This argument probably accounts for some of
the imbalances we observed, but low public and private savings rates in the developed economies,
particularly the United States, most likely also have played a role.
3 Monetary policy in a nancially-globalized environment
The increased volume of trade in nancial assets has had a signicant impact on international
borrowing terms. Spreads on emerging market bonds have decreased markedly over time, with the
EMBI index yield falling from over 16% in 1998 to just over 6% in 2006 [Spiegel (2007)]. While this
decline reects a benign decrease in the cost of borrowing by emerging market economies, it also
reects the fact that debt obligations across countries are being treated as more substitutable than
they have been in the past. This convergence in yield curves has been accompanied by convergence
in other types of asset returns. For example, convergence in cross-country equity returns has also
been documented [e.g. Ferguson (2005) and Rogo (2006)].
What does this convergence imply for monetary policy? If assets are close substitutes world-
wide, domestic interest rates are likely to be inuenced by global factors. A "savings glut" in Asia
can play a role in reducing real interest rates in the United States. In this type of environment,
it is likely to be the case that longer-term interest rates are less sensitive to transitory movements
in the Federal Funds rate, the interest rate targeted by the United States Federal Reserve, leaving
the impression that nancial globalization has left interest rates less sensitive to monetary policy
than in the past.
7Does this mean that monetary policy loses its eectiveness under nancial globalization? Some
have argued that that is the case, as in Rogo (2006), which claims that in the wake of increased
nancial globalization even the largest central banks " ... have less direct impact on medium and
long-term interest rates than might once have been the case."
In a recent paper, Woodford (2007) examines the implications of increased international nan-
cial integration for the monetary transmission mechanism in a simple version of the Clarida, Gali,
and Gertler (2002) model, in which real interest rates are equal across countries. He demonstrates
that in the special (but by no means extreme) case of unitary elasticity of substitution of domestic
and foreign goods, the degree of nancial openness has no impact on domestic aggregate demand
for a given monetary policy.4 This raises the possibility that the impact of changes in openness
need not be large. Moreover, Woodford demonstrates that in an environment of equalized real
interest rates it is still possible for monetary policy to control both nominal expenditure and ina-
tion. In contrast, foreign monetary policy can only impact domestic demand and ination through
its impact on foreign output levels. The conclusion is therefore that even under nancial globala-
tion, standard theory suggests that the monetary authority should retain the ability to control the
domestic price level.
Moreover, as noted by Rogo (2004), the fact that an individual central bank has lost some of
its short-term inuence over real interest rates does not imply that central banks as a group have
lost the ability to act in concert and inuence rates over the short-term. Central banks acting in
concert, such as the recent move by a number of banks to inject liquidity into the nancial system,
can still have a substantial impact. To the extent that countries in central banks in Asia as well as
the oil-exporting countries target the dollar in their monetary policies, the impact of policy actions
by the Federal Reserve will also be amplied [Rogo (2006)].
Finally, while nancial globalization raises opportunities for emerging market economies to
4Woodford attributes original discovery of this result under unitary elasticity of substitution to Cole and Obstfeld
(1991).
8acquire capital at more favorable interest rates, it also brings new challenges to these economies.
In particular, globalization raises the possibility of exacerbated exchange rate volatility, which can
be a source of output variability; that is, emerging economies may suer terms of trade shocks
from real exchange rate changes when nominal exchange rate movements are not passed through
to changes in domestic prices. Exchange rate depreciations can also lead to inationary pressure
through increased import prices.
Others, such as Obstfeld (1998) and Tytell and Wei (2005) have stressed the potential disci-
plining eect that increased international capital mobility could have on monetary policy. Increased
international asset substitutability reduces the eectiveness of using ination as a source of gov-
ernment revenues. Holding all else equal, this should reduce the inationary pressure on central
banks and result in lower average levels of ination. Kose, Prasad, Rogo, and Wei (2006) argue
that superior monetary policies is one of the primary "collateral benets" associated with nancial
integration. This disciplining eect has been recently noted in a number of speeches by monetary
policy makers [e.g. (Ferguson, 2005) and Kroszner (2007)].
The discipline eect also applies to the overall stability of the monetary policy regime. If
anything, it would appear to be the case that globalization raises the sensitivity of prices and
ination to changes in the monetary policy regime. The reason for this heightened sensitivity stems
from the increased substitutability of assets internationally. With increased asset substitutability,
global investors can avoid nancial markets with excessive exposure to currency risk or the risk of
the imposition of capital account restrictions, as they did to Malaysia subsequent to its imposition
of capital controls following the 1997 crisis.
Diculties for monetary policy raised by nancial globalization have also been noted. Bernanke
(2007) notes that nancial globalization may make analysis of nancial and economic conditions
more complex, arguing that increased foreign demand for U.S. assets had contributed to recent
inversions of the yield curve. Kohn (2008) acknowledges that asset price determination is more
9dependent on worldwide nancial conditions in the wake of nancial globalization, reducing the
correlation between the federal funds rate, which is directly controlled by the Federal Reserve, and
longer-term Treasury bills.
Financial globalization also has implications for the desirability of monetary policy coordina-
tion. Sutherland (2004) demonstrates that the welfare gains from monetary policy coordination
increase with increased nancial integration. The potential benets of coordination are also height-
ened by the ability of central banks acting in concert to overcome some of the diminished traction
between long-term rates and the federal funds rate discussed above. However Taylor (2008) argues
that even in under nancial globalization the benets from policy coordination are still likely to be
second order relative to to a central bank acting to control its domestic ination rate.
Increased exposure to global shocks under nancial integration may also lead to greater sus-
ceptibility to nancial crises. As many emerging market economies continue to have liabilities
denominated in dollars, exchange rate depreciations can lead to "currency mismatch" issues, as
exchange rate movements raise the relative value of liabilities and damage the nation's balance
sheet as a whole.
As such, counter to the "discipline eect" noted above, some believe that nancial globalization
hinders the ability of emerging market central banks to pursue price stability, or even formal
ination targets, as doing so leaves them open to exchange rate volatility. The intuition behind
this concern is the so-called "impossible trinity," which notes that a country cannot simultaneously
pursue price and exchange rate targets while maintaining open capital accounts. However, recent
studies, such as Rose (2007) have found that countries that target ination experience no more
exchange rate volatility on average than do countries that do not target ination.
The increased prevalence of global shocks may also make it more dicult for emerging market
economies to conduct domestic monetary policy, as increases in the diculty of assessing the value
of the domestic output gap may be more severe in these types of economies, as they often nd it
10more dicult to assess domestic economic conditions than their industrial counterparts [Wagner
(2004)].
There are also concerns that nancial globalization may be more disruptive in emerging market
economies because of the relative lack of development of their domestic nancial sectors. For
example, Levchenko (2004) demonstrates that opening up to international markets can actually
increase consumption volatility if domestic nancial markets are relatively undeveloped and agents
within the economy have heterogeneous access to external nancial markets. The reason is that risk-
sharing within the domestic economy can deteriorate if a subset of domestic agents face increased
external risk-sharing opportunities not available to all.
4 Monetary policy responses to nancial globalization
The discipline hypothesis contends that nancial globalization reduces the optimal reliance on the
ination tax, as investors can more easily ee a currency than in the past. It also reduces the optimal
intensity of optimal output stabilization, as the increased substitutability of assets internationally
increases the relative desirability of targeting ination.
Recent experience concerning monetary policy appears consistent with this hypothesis: The
additional discipline placed on monetary authorities from enhanced nancial integration has led
to advances globally in monetary policy. Countries are paying more attention to targeting the
ination rate, formally or informally, as their policy goal. Indeed, formal ination targeting is now
a common policy. As reported by Rose (2007), 14 of the 30 OECD countries now formally target
ination, while the twelve countries in the European Monetary Union have an ination target as
one of their policy goals, and the United States holds the pursuit of "price stability" as one of
its dual monetary policy targets. Moreover, ination targeting has been formally adopted by 10
emerging market economies with over 750 billion in population. Overall, formal ination targeting
11is practiced in countries representing over a quarter of the world economy.
Ination targeting regimes have also been shown to be durable. The rst explicitly formal in-
ation targeter, New Zealand, adopted its regime 17 years ago. The durability of ination targeting
regimes also compares favorably to that of exchange rate pegs. Rose (2007) nds that there is only
a 3 in 10 probability of an exchange rate regime lasting more than 8 years. Over the history of
ination targeting, only Finland and Spain have left ination targeting regimes, and in their case
they left to join the EMU, which of course has an ination target as one of its objectives.
Ination targeting regimes also tend to exhibit capital account openness. With monetary
policy concentrated on xing the price level, most ination targeters have abandoned conicting
exchange rate targets and allowed free international capital movements. This has on some occasions
led to increased exchange rate volatility, but on the whole observed capital movements have not
been as disruptive as observed speculative attacks on pegged exchange rate regimes.
The increased focus on price stability has also not been limited to formal ination targeting
regimes. Ination rates in emerging market economies have declined dramatically since ten years
ago. As shown in Figure 2, average ination rates for a representative group of emerging market
economies in 1998 stood at 16% higher than those prevailing in the industrial countries. By 2006,
that gap had been reduced to 6%, or just 4% above average levels in industrial countries. I should
also note that maintaining the industrial country average at around 2% over this period was also
an achievement attributable to countries' paying greater attention to focusing monetary policy on
maintaining price stability.
The variability of ination has also declined markedly over this period. This is relevant for
a number of reasons: First, one might suspect that a few outlier countries, such as Brazil in the
case of the emerging market economies and Japan in the case of the industrial countries, are by
themselves driving the decline in observed average ination rates. This gure demonstrates that
instead ination rates have converged across the board. Second, most economic theory would
12suggest that it is the variability of ination, rather than its overall rate, that is important in
determining output volatility, so we should be concerned with the variability of ination rather
than its level. In practice, high ination tends to coincide with variable ination, which is why
keeping the rate of ination under control is usually sucient to control its variability as well. The
previous ten years have been no exception to this rule. As average ination rates fell worldwide,
the variability of ination has fallen as well.
The renewed focus on controlling ination and ination expectations has led to improved
conditions in capital markets, neglecting the recent short-term volatility that has occurred. Long-
term yields have decreased globally and the slopes of yield curves throughout the world have
attened considerably. These lowered reduced curves worldwide have also allowed emerging market
economies to issue longer-term debt at favorable terms. Firms in emerging market economies have
moved from bank borrowing in external so-called "hard" currencies towards external borrowing in
bonds denominated in their domestic currencies with relatively long maturities and xed interest
rates. Korea and Thailand introduced 10-year domestic-currency bonds in the 1990s, while by
the year 2000, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Indonesia, Mexico and Russia had also issued domestic
currency bonds [(Kroszner, 2007)]. As these instruments have become more standard, their yields
have decreased.
This shift has accomplished a number of desirable achievements: First, currency risk has been
shifted from borrower to lender. Second, the xed interest rates have shifted interest rate risk to
creditors as well. Third, the longer maturities reduce the risk of disruptive "sudden stops" in credit
that have resulted in costly failures in the past. Fourth, government issues in local currency have
helped encourage the development of local bond markets by providing "benchmark" yield curves
for pricing private debt.
Finally, when defaults do take place, contagion is limited by the wide dispersion of creditors.
One can contrast the implications of the immense recent Argentine default to outcomes in Latin
13America in the early 1980s, when the balance sheets of a number of prominent global commercial
banks were devastated by losses from default. However, the large number of creditors may also
leave it leave it more dicult to pursue renegotiation with problem debtors.
To summarize, nancial globalization has decreased the relative desirability of using monetary
policy to stabilize output in favor of increasing attention towards the pursuit of price stability. In
response, monetary policy makers have shifted their emphasis towards achieving price stability,
with many formally adopting ination targeting regimes. The response from nancial markets
has been relatively benign, with lower and less variable ination and better borrowing terms for
emerging market economies. Notably, this pattern has not been markedly reversed under the recent
sub-prime nancial market turmoil.
5 Evidence on globalization and monetary policy
5.1 Specication
In this section, I examine the evidence on nancial integration and monetary policy outcomes,
measured as median ination rates over a variety of periods. As in much of the literature, the
analysis is not structural and measurement of a number of key variables is almost certainly done
with error. As a result, I examine a reduced-form specication of the determinants of ination that
includes my variable of interest and then subject the analysis to a battery of robustness tests.
As discussed above, the instrument introduced in this paper, a measure of nancial remoteness,
is time-invariant and hence not conducive to use in a panel. As a result, I examine both cross-
sectional and panel results depending on whether the geography-based instrument is used.
Data for nancial remoteness and most of the conditioning variables are taken from Rose
and Spiegel (2008). As in that paper, the cross section data primarily comes from 11-year period
averages from 1994 through 2004 inclusive, while panel data consists of 5-year averages from 1980
14through 2004 inclusive. Exceptions include ination data which comes from the IMF International
Financial Statistics, and measures of nancial openness, which are taken from Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2007).
The default specication for the cross-sectional analysis is as follows
log(i) =  + 1FinOpeni + 2TrdOpeni + 3Govi + 4Poli + 5Popi + i; (1)
where log(i) represents the log of the absolute value of median ination of country i over the 11-
year period. FinOpeni represents our variable of interest, the level of nancial integration. This
variable is measured as the sum of stocks of external assets and liabilities of FDI and portfolio
investment as a share of GDP,5
I include the following conditioning variables: TrdOpeni represents trade openness, measured
as the average of the sum of exports plus imports as a share of GDP. I include this variable because
countries that are open on their capital account are likely to be open on their trade account as well,
so there is a danger that the variable of interest would actually be picking up the eect of trade
openness if one did not condition for this characteristic. Govi represents government spending,
measured as the average of government spending as a share of GDP. holding all else equal, one
would expect a positive coecient on government spending, as a nation's central bank may be
induced to resort to the ination tax to some degree with increases in government expenditures.
Poli represents the average polity score, indicating the quality of domestic institutions,6 One would
probably expect a negative coecient on this variable, as nations with superior domestic institutions
should be less susceptible to timing-inconsistency-based inationary biases. I control for country
5Unlike (Tytell and Wei, 2005), we do not include debt stock data in our openness measure. As discussed in their
paper, either measurement method would be biased as coverage of debt volumes is not complete. In any event, our
base specication yields results that are similar to theirs, suggesting that the results are insensitive to the inclusion
or exclusion of debt ows in the nancial openness measure.
6The measure is actually the "polity2" score, obtained from the Polity IV Project Data Set. For details see
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity.
15size via Popi, which measures average population levels. It is unclear what sign one should expect
on this variable. Finally, i represents an error term assumed to be i.i.d.
I rst test the above specication in a cross-section, with and without the nancial remoteness
instrument, FinRemi, which is measured as the minimum distance from one of the major three
international nancial centers, London, New York, or Tokyo. Using this measure, Mauritius and
South Africa are the most nancially remote countries in our sample, while Belgium and the
Netherlands are the least nancially remote.7 I then move to pooled and panel specications
of averages over 5-year periods from 1984 through 2004. I use panel specications correcting for
country xed eects in the direct 5-year specications without instrumenting, and also report results
for pooled specications with nancial remoteness used as an instrument for nancial integration.
In the latter specication, I allow for error clustering by country. Heteroskedasticity-consistent
standard errors are reported throughout.
Summary statistics for the 11-year cross-section sample are shown in Table 1. It can be seen
that there are notable dierences between high income countries and the rest of the sample. High
income countries have median ination rates that are substantially lower, 0.80 vs. 1.93, and much
lower ination volatility as well, 0.51 vs. 1.04. It can also be seen that higher income countries are
more nancially open and less nancially remote. It can also be seen that correlations between both
our measure of nancial openness and our measure of nancial remoteness and median ination
rates are relatively igh in absolute value, at -0.32 and 0.28 respectively.
5.2 Results
Results for the cross-section sample are shown in Table 2. Model 1 runs our base specication. It
can be seen that the variable of interest, FinOpeni, enters with its predicted negative sign at a
7As in Rose and Spiegel (2008), the United Kingdom, the United States, and Japan are dropped from the sample.
I also drop Luxembourg, which is an outlier in the nancial openness measure at over 10,000. The next highest value
in the sample, Hong Kong, has a 508 score.
16highly statistically signicant level. Moreover, the coecient point estimate suggests that a one
standard deviation increase in nancial integration, which would equal 74.89 in our sample, would
result in a decrease in expected median log ination of 0.45, an economically signicant decline.
Concerning the other conditioning variables, the only one that enters signicantly is Popi, which
enters with a negative coecient, suggesting that ination levels are lower on average in larger
countries in our sample.
Model 2 introduces the conditioning variable DomCrdi, which measures domestic credit held
by domestic commercial banks as a share of GDP. This variable is introduced as an indicator of the
level of development of the domestic banking sector. The intuition behind adding this variable is
that international nancial integration is likely to have a smaller impact on domestic macroeconomic
performance the more developed is the domestic nancial sector. It can be seen that the variable
of interest is robust to the inclusion of this conditioning variable, as it continues to enter with its
expected negative at statistically signicant levels. However, the coecient estimate drops by 50%
relative to the base specication.
Concerning the other conditioning variables, the polity variable, Poli enters with a positive
coecient at a marginal 10% level of statistical signicance, suggesting that democracy is associ-
ated with increased ination in our cross-section. The DomCrdi variable is enters negatively, as
expected, at a 1% condence level.
Model 3 introduces a conditioning variable for country wealth, GDPC01i, which measures
GDP per capita in 2001. As was the case for the domestic credit variable, this variable also enters
negatively and is highly statistically signicant, suggesting that wealthier countries exhibit lower
average ination.8
8I also examined the implications of including an OECD dummy into the cross-section specications. Unsurpris-
ingly, this variable acted similarly to conditioning for per capita income. Its inclusion knocked out the FinOpeni;t
variable when it was introduced on its own. When introduced in the presence of the GDPC01 variable, these two
variables tended to cancel each other out, with one entering positively and one negatively, which is not surprising as
we would expect them to be quite collinear. These results were submitted to the referee and are available from the
author upon request.
17It can be seen that the variable of interest, FinOpeni, is not robust to the inclusion of this
variable. The Popi and Poli again enter with their negative and positive signs at statistically
signicant levels.
Models 4 through 6 report results for instrumental variable estimation of the same specica-
tions, using FinRemi as an instrument for FinOpeni. The variable of interest continues to enter
negatively at a statistically signicant level in the base specication, Model 4, and is even larger in
size. This suggests that the base results are robust to instrumenting for observed levels of nancial
integration. Moreover, the coecient estimate on the variable of interest in the instrumented spec-
ication is close to triple the level obtained under OLS. However, Models 5 and 6 demonstrate that
the nancial openness variable is not robust to conditioning for either the level of development of
the domestic nancial sector or country wealth.
Table 3 reports the results from the pooled and panel 5-year sample. Model 1 reports the
results of 5-year panel estimation with time and country xed eects included.9 Estimation is
again done using robust standard errors and I also allow for error clustering by country. It can
be seen that the nancial openness variable is almost completely insignicant. Indeed, the only
conditioning variable that enters at any standard signicance level is the Poli, which again enters
at a 10% condence level, suggesting again that increases in democracy are also associated with
increased ination.10
Model 2 adds the DomCrdi;t conditioning variable, with similar results. The nancial openness
variable coecient estimate is close to 0 and very insignicant, and the only variable that enters at
any standard signicance level is again the polity variable. Model 3 adds the conditioning variable
for country wealth, GDPC01i. As this variable is time-invariant, country xed eects are dropped.
9Coecient estimates for xed eects are suppressed in the tables, but are available upon request from the author.
10The polity index is censored at a score of 10, and many of the most industrial countries, such as the G7 countries,
earn a score of 10 through our sample. As such, this variable is not time-varying for these countries in panel
estimation. As a robustness check, I ran the panel specication without the polity variable and obtained similar
results. In particular, the coecient estimate on FinOpeni;t is close to 0 and very insignicant.
18It can be seen that the coecient estimate on the nancial openness variable remains close to 0 and
is very insignicant. Concerning the conditioning variables, the Poli again enters with a positive
sign at statistically signicant levels, and the trade openness variable enters signicantly with its
expected negative sign. In addition, the GDP per capita variable is signicantly negative, again
suggesting that wealthier countries have lower median ination levels.
Models 4 through 6 run the same instrumental variable specications as in the previous table.
Country xed eects are dropped as the nancial remoteness instrument is time-invariant, leaving
this a pooled 5-year sample. I again allow for error clustering by country and report robust standard
errors. The variable of interest, FinOpeni;t, enters with its expected negative sign in Model 4 at
a 5% signicance level. However, Models 5 and 6 demonstrate that this result is not robust to
conditioning for either the level of development of the domestic nancial sector or cross-country
dierences in income per capita, as this variable is very insignicant in both of these alternative
specications.
Overall, our results conrm a negative relationship between nancial openness and median
ination levels in our base specication. Moreover, this relationship appears to be robust to in-
strumenting for nancial openness with our measure of nancial remoteness, in the sense that the
nancial openness variable retains its signicance under IV in both the cross-section and the panel
exercises. However, the performance of the nancial openness variable was shown to be sensitive
to either adding variables to condition for cross-country dierences in income or the sophistication
of the domestic nancial sector, or including country xed eects in our panel specication. This
raises the troubling possibility that nancial openness may be just one of a number of features of
low ination countries, leaving it dicult to assess empirically which of the features are those that
are crucial to achieving monetary stability.11
11As a robustness check, I added lagged values of ination, FinOpeni;t, and TrdOpeni;t to the specications in
Table 3. The results were largely robust to the inclusion of these variables. For the OLS specications, the FinOpeni;t
variable of interest remained insignicant, as did its lagged value. For the instrumented specications, the results were
actually somewhat stronger than those reported in the text, in the sense that the coecient estimate on FinOpeni;t
195.3 Robustness Checks
In this section, I move to examine the robustness of the results above. For each perturbation of the
specications or samples reported above, I consider four models: I run the base specication with
and without instrumenting using the nancial remoteness for the 11-year cross section and then
run the panel 5-year sample with time and country xed eects and then a pooled version of the
5-year sample without country xed eects, but with instrumenting using the nancial remoteness
variable and allowing for error clustering by country. To save space, I only report the coecient
estimate on the variable of interest, FinOpeni;t.
I rst introduce a number of additional conditioning variables. First, I introduce a measure
of de jure capital account openness. It can be seen that the nancial openness variable enters at
statistically signicant levels with its expected negative sign for both specications using the 11-
year cross-section, and for the pooled IV specication. However, the variable is insignicant when
country xed eects are included (Model 3). Second, I introduce a measure of "trade remoteness,"
measured as distance from the rest of the world weighted by GDP, and achieve similar results. The
nancial openness variable continues to enter negatively at statistically signicant levels for models
1, 2, and 4, but enters positively at 5% statistical signicance with xed eects included in Model
3.
I next report the base IV specications with an alternative instrument, namely proximity to
the nearest oshore nancial center. In a recent paper, Rose and Spiegel (2007) demonstrate that
proximity to oshore nancial centers have an inuence on domestic nancial sectors, suggesting
that distance from the nearest oshore nancial center is an alternative measure of international
nancial remoteness. The nancial openness variable fails to enter signicantly in either IV speci-
cation, although it does obtain its expected negative coecient estimate. However, this alternative
continued to enter negatively at statistically signicant levels in Model 4, but was also signicantly negative in Model
5. The FinOpeni;t variable again became insignicant after conditioning for GDP per capita. These results were
submitted to the referee and are also available from the author upon request.
20instrument has a much lower correlation with the instrumented variable in our sample (-0.12). As
such, its failure to enter signicantly sheds little light on the importance of the nancial openness
variable for ination.
I next examine the implications of a number of changes in the sample. First I exclude "rich"
countries, proxied in our sample as the set of OECD members. It can be seen that the nancial
openness variable fails to achieve statistical signicance for any of the four specications. Next,
I exclude "very big" countries, dened as those exceeding populations of 150 million. In this
case, the results are similar to those in the base specications: The nancial openness variable
enters signicantly with its expected negative coecient using the 11 year sample, with or without
instrumenting. The variable also enters signicantly with its expected sign for the pooled 5-year
sample using nancial remoteness as an instrument for nancial openness (Model 4). However, it
fails to enter signicantly for the panel specication with xed eects included (Model 3).
Similar results are obtained when very small countries, dened as those with populations fewer
than 10 million, are excluded. The nancial openness variable enters negatively using the 11-year
sample, although it marginally misses 10% signicance under the IV specication. With the ve-
year panel and pooled-IV samples, the variable of interest is again insignicant. However, the
variable is close to 10% signicance in the instrumented pooled specication.
Lastly, I drop some geographic groups. The cross-sectional results obtained in the base spec-
ication are robust to dropping Sub-Saharan Africa, although the variable of interest only enters
in the IV specication at 10% signicance. Similarly, dropping countries from Latin America and
the Caribbean does not markedly aect the performance of our variable of interest, as nancial
openness continues to enter negatively at statistically signicant levels in our 11-year cross-section,
or in the instrumented pooled sample, but is insignicant in our panel specication with country
xed eects included.
Taking Table 4 as a whole, it appears that the base specication appears to be relatively robust
21to these additional conditioning variables or changes in samples for the 11-year cross-section, with
the lone exception being the exclusion of the rich countries. The pooled IV specication (Model
4) also appears to be relatively robust to specication or sample changes. However, the nancial
openness variable is almost universally insignicant when country xed eects are added, and indeed
usually obtains an incorrect positive point estimate. Overall, these results echo the sensitivity of
the results above to conditioning for levels of GDP per capita, and raises the concern that de facto
measures of nancial openness empirically are too closely linked to country income levels or other
cross-country discrepancies to isolate their role in such a specication.
6 Conclusion
The relatively large literature reviewed above suggests that nancial openness, while increasing the
exposure of nations to foreign shocks, has provided an additional source of market discipline and
has encouraged central banks to place greater emphasis on stabilizing prices relative to output.
This change in policy appears to have contributed to the benign conditions observed in nancial
markets over the past fteen years, as nations have experienced decreased output volatility, lower
ination rates, and reduced borrowing costs worldwide.
While neither the positive aggregate performance of the recent past nor the explosion of gross
holdings of international assets over the same period can be denied, it must be granted that it
has proven to be challenging to establish a link between nancial globalization and macroeconomic
stability. Sadly, it appears that establishing a robust connection between nancial openness and
monetary policy will be challenging as well.
This paper examines the relationship between ination levels and nancial globalization in
both a cross-country cross-section and a panel sample, and introduces nancial remoteness as a
plausibly exogenous instrument for nancial openness. By and large, I conrm the ndings in the
22previous literature of a negative relationship between nancial openness and median ination levels
in my base specication. Moreover, these basic results appear to be largely robust to instrumenting
for nancial openness using the nancial remoteness variable. However, nancial openness almost
universally became insignicant in the presence of conditioning for country xed eects in panel
specications, or for cross-country discrepancies in national income, either by explicitly introducing
per capita income as an additional conditioning variable, or by excluding the set of OECD countries
from our sample.
It therefore appears to be the case that nancial openness is one of a number of characteristics
of countries that exhibit monetary policy stability, and that it would be dicult to isolate the
"crucial" policy characteristic in this framework. Indeed Kose, Prasad, Rogo, and Wei (2006)
recently concluded that the primary benets of nancial globalization may precisely be "collateral
benets," such as the possibility of enhanced monetary policy outcomes examined here, that may
resist empirical detection in cross-country studies, or even in medium-length panels, such as those
examined above.
Finally, it should be noted that the recent "sub-prime" nancial turmoil warrants reassessment
of the relatively benign characterization of the impact of nancial globalization in the literature
reviewed above. One of the primary causes of the rapid increase in nancial globalization over the
past years has been the innovations in nancial vehicles for hedging global investment positions.
The recent sub-prime crisis has highlighted the downside of this increased sophistication: As asset
bundles became more diversied, they also tended to become more opaque, and it became more
dicult to assess underlying asset quality of investment positions, and indeed ultimate exposure
positions as well.
While the implications of the current crisis are beyond the scope of this survey, the crisis
does raise the question of whether losses incurred from investment vehicles increasingly used in
the globalization period will lead investors to avoid these types of vehicles in the future, and
23in the process reduce the pace of nancial globalization. At this point, the implications of the
current crisis is uncertain, but it seems unlikely that the pace of nancial globalization will quickly
diminish. Increased internationalization of investment portfolios is still associated with reduced
overall portfolio risk, holding all else equal, as investors worldwide still appear to be excessively
exposed to home assets. However, it seems likely that investors will be more hesitant to hold as
opaque bundles of investment vehicles in the future.
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27Table 1: Summary Statistics
No. of Countries log() FinOpen FinRem ;FinOpen ;FinRem FinOpen;FinRem
Full Sample 127 1.67 53.59 7.71 -0.32 0.28 -0.34
[1.06] [74.89] [0.65]
High Income Countries 29 0.80 130.11 7.07 -0.30 0.10 -0.17
[0.51] [125.96] [0.83]
Average to Low Income Countries 98 1.93 31.72 7.87 -0.10 0.07 0.06
[1.04] [25.09] [0.49]
Notes: Statistics shown are for 11-year sample, 1994-2004. Standard deviation
reported in brackets. x;y  correlation of x and y.
Figure 1: Portfolio and FDI ows into China versus foreign reserves
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Sources: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006); International Financial Statistics, IMF
$ billions
Notes: Sum of portfolio, equity, and foreign direct investment (FDI) liabilities, and
foreign currency reserves excluding gold, in China from 1998 through 2006.
28Table 2: Cross sectional evidence on nancial openness and ination volatility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 1.745*** 2.288*** 2.171*** 1.889*** 2.240*** 2.383***
(0.381) (0.368) (0.353) (0.412) (0.382) (0.818)
FinOpen -0.006*** -0.003** -0.001 -0.016** -0.007 0.015
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.007) (0.008) (0.057)
TrdOpen 0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.009 0.003 -0.010
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.005) (0.035)
Gov 0.009 0.001 0.003 -0.007 -0.003 0.017
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.015) (0.013) (0.050)
Pol 0.008 0.030* 0.037** 0.030 0.033** 0.039**
(0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.020) (0.016) (0.019)
Pop -0.000** 0.000 -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000





Observations 122 121 122 122 121 122
R-squared 0.15 0.28 0.31
Notes: Dependent Variable is log(). 11-year cross section estimation with White's
heteroskedasticity correction. Standard errors in parentheses. Models 1 through 3
report OLS estimation, while Models 4 through 6 report IV estimation with nancial
remoteness used as an instrument for the FinOpen variable. *** signicant at 1
percent condence level. ** signicant at 5 percent condence level. * signicant
at 10 percent condence level.
29Table 3: 5-year pooled evidence on nancial remoteness and monetary policy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 3.740 1.546*** 2.265*** 2.736*** 2.605*** 2.722***
(4.248) (0.564) (0.281) (0.310) (0.435) (0.507)
FinOpen 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.028** -0.031 -0.029
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.012) (0.024) (0.048)
TrdOpen 0.001 0.001 -0.006*** 0.007 0.008 0.007
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.008) (0.014) (0.027)
Gov -0.008 -0.010 0.002 -0.015 -0.017 -0.016
(0.014) (0.014) (0.008) (0.013) (0.018) (0.031)
Pol 0.032* 0.034* 0.034*** 0.030* 0.031 0.031
(0.018) (0.019) (0.011) (0.017) (0.021) (0.023)
Pop -0.000 -0.000 -0.000** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000





Observations 511 506 511 511 506 511
R-squared 0.74 0.74 0.31
Notes: Dependent Variable is log(). 5-year pooled sample estimation by OLS
with White's heteroskedasticity correction and clustering by country. Standard
errors in parentheses. Models 1 through 3 report OLS estimation, while Models 4
through 6 report IV estimation with nancial remoteness used as an instrument for
the FinOpen variable. Country xed eects are included in Models 1 and 2. ***
signicant at 1 percent condence level. ** signicant at 5 percent condence level.
* signicant at 10 percent condence level.
30Table 4: Robustness Checks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Add de jure capital controls -0.006*** -0.015** 0.000 -0.033**
(0.002) (0.007) (0.001) (0.016)
Add trade remoteness -0.006*** -0.015** 0.005** -0.022**
(0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.010)
Use alternative instrument: ofcmingr -0.047 -0.076
(0.043) (0.107)
Exclude rich countries -0.003 0.016 -0.006 0.014
(0.005) (0.031) (0.005) (0.037)
Exclude very big countries -0.006*** -0.016** 0.000 -0.027**
(0.002) (0.007) (0.001) (0.012)
Exclude very small countries -0.012*** -0.017** 0.001 -0.029
(0.004) (0.008) (0.003) (0.018)
Drop Sub-saharan Africa -0.006*** -0.009* 0.001 -0.022*
(0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.011)
Drop Latin America & Caribbean -0.006*** -0.017** 0.001 -0.021**
(0.002) (0.007) (0.001) (0.009)
Notes: Dependent Variable is log(). Table reports coecient estimates for
FinOpen variable. Coecient estimates for full specication available upon re-
quest. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Models 1 and 2 report results for
11-year cross section, while Models 3 and 4 report results for 5-year panel. Models
1 and 3 estimated by OLS while Models 2 and 4 by IV with nancial remoteness
variable used as an instrument for FinOpen variable. Country xed eects included
in Model 3. *** signicant at 1 percent condence level. ** signicant at 5 percent
condence level. * signicant at 10 percent condence level.
31Figure 2: Average Ination 1998-2007, industrial and emerging market economies

















Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF
Notes: Average ination rates from 1998 through 2007 for 22 industrial countries
and 24 emerging market economies. Lists of included countries available upon
request.
32Figure 3: Std. Dev. of Ination 1998-2007, industrial and emerging market economies













Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF
Notes: Standard deviation of ination rates from 1998 through 2007 for 22 industrial
countries and 24 emerging market economies. Lists of included countries available
upon request.
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